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Ad hoc routing inherently serves two separate and conf icting divisions of interest: the
needs of the user or individual and the needs of the network or community. These interests
should be secured differently.
The proposed research is a dual-agent approach for securing ad hoc routing protocols.
This approach assumes a physical division of tasks into user agent tasks and tasks performed by a trustworthy network agent. The research, motivated by the need to reduce the
tasks of the network agent, investigates strategies for an optimal division of labor while
promoting the faithful execution of the routing protocol. This investigation employs the
dual agent approach for securing a variant of distance vector routing.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The world is covered in networks from end to end: phone, computer, wired and wireless networks. One of the primary services that a network requires is routing. Routing,
in its simplest form, is providing a path between two entities in a network and forwarding
data along that path for communication purposes. Early routing research completely ignored the possible presence of malicious entities in the network. However, this optimistic
view does not hold in practice, malicious entities are present and their ability to disrupt
routing must be addressed.

1.1 Problem Statement
In conventional networks the task of routing is performed by large network operators.
In mobile ad hoc networks, which do not rely on existing network infrastructure, every
node has to cooperate to route packets between them. The tasks performed by a node in
an ad hoc network can be classif ed into “self sh” tasks that are useful only for the node
performing the task and “self ess” tasks performed for the benef t of the entire network.
Securing such cooperative tasks requires proactive measures to ensure that the nodes will
indeed adhere to rules that govern the tasks. Obviously, individuals have more motivation
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to abide by the rules that govern self sh tasks. Thus, the design of strategies for ensuring
adherence to rules should consider the different approaches for securing different tasks.
One of the primary limitations of existing ad hoc routing protocols stems from the lack
of distinction between approaches to protect the integrity of self sh and self ess tasks. This
distinction should not only be a logical partition but a physical partition. Recent work [17]
has indicated the feasibility of low cost trustworthy computers, as long as the complexity
of the trustworthy computer is maintained at very low levels. The need for distinction
of tasks and the feasibility of low cost trustworthy computing modules, together, are the
motivators for the dual-agent approach for routing protocols.

1.1.1 Research Goals
The division of labor between the agents is considered to f nd a balanced solution that
provides both necessary security and minimal requirements on the network agent. The
primary goal is to reduce the cost of the network agent by reducing the complexity of
its tasks, in terms of its computational and storage requirements. Inherent limitations of
the dual-agent approach, primarily arising from the network agent’s lack of resources, are
considered.
The primary challenge is optimal tasks sharing strategies, while taking into consideration the different levels of protection that need to be extended to different tasks and the
inherent limitations of the network agent. The network agent tasks are limited to those
that can be performed by a simple logic engine that can eff ciently reuse a single hardware
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block cipher. Specif cally, this thesis addresses dual agent strategies for securing a variant
of a distance vector routing protocol.

1.1.2 Hypothesis
The hypothesis is that an optimal division of labor can be found between the network
agent and the user agent that reduces the requirements of the network agent to
• a symmetric block cipher (used for encryption and hashing) and
• a few kilobytes of storage.
Regardless of these limitations, the low complexity network agent will provide assurances
of security against different types of attacks by the user agent.

1.1.3 Research Approach
The attacks against the dual agent approach, consisting of strategies of the user agent to
circumvent the protocol, were identif ed and classif ed into four broad categories: fabrication, selective dropping, omission, and replay attacks. Low complexity strategies (within
the capabilities of the network agents) to address these attacks were identif ed. Specif cally, a strategy similar to the next secure (NSEC) record (used in DNSSEC for authenticated denial of existence of DNS resource records) and Bloom f lters were identif ed as
eff cient strategies to address the attacks.
To obtain an estimate for the overheads required for the network agent tasks in practical deployments, the broad strategies designed to protect the integrity of routing protocols
were applied to a distance vector protocol. More specif cally, the protocol tested was based
3

on the Destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector (DSDV) protocol. A simulation environment was developed which implements the dual-agent distance-vector protocol. For the
purposes of off ine analysis of potential attacks and complexity of tasks to address such
attacks, the environment produces snapshots of routing tables of all nodes were recorded
at the beginning of each interval. The environment is also capable of producing a perpetual
list of real-time revoked routes.

4

CHAPTER 2
PRIOR WORK

An early example of routing is the transfer of a phone call across the telephone system.
The phone system once used humans as switching units to manually create routes to connect two people. Improvements in technology replaced people with analog switches, and
eventually with digital switching equipment. Many of the same technologies are used to
connect computers in small networks, interconnect networks, and even support the Internet. Because of this, routing is a signif cant research area. Some of the goals for routing are
to provide the fastest connection, the shortest connection, or the least expensive connection
between two parties. Routing strategies must also be able to handle dynamic changes in
network topology. Different routing strategies may be suited for meeting the requirements
unique to different applications.
Ad hoc networks are a more recent concept in networking. These networks typically
require the members to implicitly trust one another, and in the very least, they must trust the
routing information received. DSDV [16], Ad Hoc on Demand Distance Vector Routing
(AODV) [15], and Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) [12, 11] are some examples of ad hoc
routing protocols. All such protocols explicitly expect the members of the network to fully
cooperate in the protocol. This implicit trust has also proved to be their greatest weakness.

5

Security was not considered in the initial development of ad hoc networking protocols.
This is not surprising since routing protocols are extremely complex.

2.1 Distance Vector Routing
Distance-vector routing has many names: Bellman-Ford routing, Ford-Fulkerson algorithm, RIP, etc. Basic distance-vector routing is a proactive protocol since it relies on
periodic updates of routing information. With this type of routing a node is expected to
learn the distance value associated with all other nodes in the network. Routing information is passed as routing tables between neighbors. The distance value represents a network
measurement, such as hop count. Routing tables consist of node id, best distance value
to reach the node, and next hop for reaching the node. Periodically the nodes exchange
tables, indicating node id and the best distance value of all nodes, with their neighbors.
Following receipt of every routing update, the nodes make appropriate corrections to their
tables [22].
One serious f aw of distance-vector routing is the count to inf nity problem[22]. The
problem occurs when a node becomes unavailable. Figure 2.1 is a small example network.
Once the network has reached steady state node 10 has a route to node 7 through node
4. Now assume that node 7 becomes unavailable. The next time node 10 sends routing
information it will include a route to node 7 of length two. Node 4 no longer has a route of
length one to node 7, and because of this it accepts the route of length two from node 10.
Now node 4 has a route to node 7 with the next hop as node 10, and Node 10 has a route to

6

node 7 with a next hop set to node 4. The circular route continues each update increasing
the hop count until it reaches some maximum value.

Figure 2.1
Example Distance Vector Network Topology

2.2 Dynamic Destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector Routing
Dynamic Destination-Sequence Distance-Vector routing (DSDV) is a very interesting
protocol. The protocol solves the count to inf nity problem that is experienced in the basic
distance vector protocol. This is accomplished by the introduction of a sequence number
associated with the source of the information and including the next hop with each routing
update. The sequence number retains an even value if the route is valid, but changes to an
odd value if the route destination becomes unreachable. The additional overhead ensures
loop free operation without the count to inf nity problem, assuming that the system has
reached a steady state [16].

7

The addition of a sequence number and the next hop is not the only change to the basic
DV protocol introduced in DSDV. Some events also trigger a reactive response which
causes a node to send an intermediate update which only contains changes since the last
periodic update [16].
DSDV also includes additional data within the routing table that each node maintains to
reduce network overhead. The routing table consists of the following values: destination,
next hop, metric, install time, stable data[16]. The metric is the hop count to a given
destination. Install time is the time at which the route was added to the table, while stable
data is an aggregation of data that represents the amount of time before receiving the f rst
route for a particular destination and the time until the best route will be received[16].
This data is used to determine how long to wait before sending a route update to prevent
f ooding the network with excess traff c after each and every change[16].

2.3 Secure Routing Research
Research in secure routing is mostly contained within three categories: malicious activity detection and mitigation, cryptographic route authentication, and the use of tamper
resistant devices to ensure adherence to the rules by participants [8, 23].

2.3.1 Without Trusted Computing Modules
Kimaya Sanzgiri et al. [18] propose the Authenticated Routing for Ad hoc Networks
(ARAN) protocol for securing ad hoc networks. The proposed protocol requires that all
nodes wishing to participate receive a certif cate from an online trusted authority and use
8

asymmetric cryptography for route authentication [18]. This requirement of a central authority is unrealistic in many types of ad hoc networks.
Secure Ad Hoc on Demand Distance Vector Routing (SAODV) [23] is an extension
of AODV. Like ARAN, SAODV makes use of asymmetric cryptography to authenticate
routing information. However, the use of asymmetric cryptography is taxing [23]. This
result, though not entirely unexpected, is useful in realizing that asymmetric cryptography
is too expensive in terms of computational requirements.
Yih-Chun Hu et al. [7] developed the Secure Eff cient Distance Vector Routing (SEAD)
protocol which addresses Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. SEAD provides authentication
for sequence numbers and the distance value through the use of hashing functions. This
approach reduces the computational overhead of authentication as compared with asymmetric cryptography.
Ariadne[9], developed before SEAD, is yet another attempt to secure routing protocols.
Another protocol, TESLA, is used to handle broadcast authentication for Ariadne without
the use of asymmetric cryptography[9]. It uses commitment keys and hashing algorithms
for authentication. This is done by loose time synchronization between the nodes and
the publishing of keys for authenticating prior messages[9]. One attack against Ariadne
allows a malicious node to create an authenticated route that does not exist [6]. The attack
is possible due to the malicious users being able to collect locality information based on
route requests through the node or nodes they control. Secure systems should not allow
malicious users to propagate f ctitious routes.
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Secure Dynamic Source Routing (SDSR) [13], as the name implies, is another DSR
based secure routing protocol. SDSR makes use of asymmetric cryptography. One primary
advantage to SDSR is that the nodes do not require the existence of a trusted authority.

2.3.2 With Trusted Modules
While the use of secure coprocessors for routing is not a new new idea, current work
does not address the division of labor between the network agent and user agent. Sean
Smith of Los Alamos National Laboratory suggests the use of secure coprocessors, “in
every step of a communications and computation path [19].” Joo-Han Song et al. [20] propose the use of secure coprocessors specif cally for secure routing. The proposal involves
integrating medium access control (MAC) into the secure coprocessor. The MAC is the
portion of a networking device that mediates access to the physical medium where data is
transferred. The addition of the MAC drivers within the trusted boundary may be feasible,
but due to the wide variety of MAC layer protocols, and for the purpose of rendering this
research to have a broader applicability, in this research we do not assume that the MAC
layer is under the control of the network agent. Furthermore, extending the capability of
the tamper resistant module will also increase its cost. For such a device to be prolif c, the
device must be inexpensive especially in the case of wireless sensor devices.
In addition to introducing complexity, there are many problems that arise from including the MAC layer within the bounds of the tamper resistant device. One of the primary
reasons for not including the MAC layer is that technology changes rapidly. A secure
device, once built, cannot be disassembled and upgraded to the new technology. A pos10

sibly more important concept is that if an entity wishes to build a secure coprocessor it
becomes application specif c. For example, it must contain a wireless communicator or
wired connector. If one wishes to use the same device for many types of networks, they
must now include all of the MAC layer components for each type of network the device is
to interact with. With all of the additional components the device is now more expensive
and potentially less secure.
Michael Jarrett and Paul Ward propose the Trusted Computing Ad-hoc On-Demand
Distance Vector (TCAODV) [10] routing protocol. This protocol relies on the Trusted
Platform Module and asymmetric cryptography. TCAODV attempts to verify the successful transmission and receipt of messages from the physical hardware, in fact, it relies on
this ability to provide assurances of security [10].
Levente Buttyán and Jean-Pierre Hubaux introduce the idea of nuglets [5] to ensure
the participation of parties in routing. A nuglet is a counter used as a form of currency for
sending data. By forwarding data and routing information a node earns nuglets; a node
then uses a nuglet by sending its own data. The counter is stored within the secure coprocessor. The idea is quite interesting since it provides nodes with the option of participating
or not depending on the users interests. This approach only addresses the wants and needs
of the user and the needs of the whole are not discussed.
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CHAPTER 3
DUAL-AGENT APPROACH

Before introducing the approach it is necessary to describe two data structures that will
be used in the approach: Bloom f lters and next secure f eld.

3.1 Data Structures
3.1.1 Bloom f lters
Bloom f lters were f rst introduced by Burton H. Bloom [3]. These f lters provide a
randomized f xed-space data structure for inserting and querying the existence of an item
within a set. It is important to note some key facts about Bloom f lters. First a Bloom f lter
will never return a false negative, but there is a potential for false positives. The probability
for false positives can be determined in advance if the maximum number of items the set
will contain is known [4]. Once an item has been added to the f lter it cannot be removed.
A Bloom f lter is def ned by three variables,
• m - the number of bits used to represent the f lter,
• k - the number of hash functions used to insert and query items, and
• n - the number of items the f lter holds.
Initialization of a Bloom f lter is done by zeroing all m bits of the Bloom f lter. Initialization can occur at any time, clearing all items from the f lter.
12

Items are inserted into a Bloom f lter by hashing the value of an item by each of the
k hash functions and setting a corresponding bit within the Bloom f lter for each hash
function. The hash functions should be independent and map an item to one bit per hash
function within the f lter[4]. Once a bit is set it will not be cleared until the Bloom f lter
is initialized again. Figure 3.1 demonstrates the insertion of messages m1 and m2 into an
empty Bloom f lter with k = 2.
0000000000

h1 (m1 ) = 1
h2 (m1 ) = 5

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

0100010000
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

h1 (m2 ) = 1
h2 (m2 ) = 4

0100110000
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Figure 3.1
Inserting m1 and m2 into Empty Bloom f lter

An item is queried by hashing the value by each of the k hash functions and checking
if the corresponding bits are set in the f lter [3]. If any of the bits are 0 then the item is not
contained within the set. If all the bits corresponding to each hash function are set then
either the item is in the Bloom f lter or a collision has occurred. A collision occurs when
a value being inserted hashes to one or more values already contained in the f lter or when
an item queried hashes to locations previously set by one or more messages.
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3.1.2 Domain Name System Security Extensions
Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) [1, 2] is a massive undertaking
to secure the Domain Name System (DNS) for the Internet. The interest with regard to
this work is specif c to the next secure (NSEC) [2] chain combined with public key cryptography as described in IETF RFC 40341. Public key cryptography is vital in DNSSEC
because it allows any and all users to verify the authenticity of the records. The NSEC
chain is the key element in providing a method for authenticated denial of DNS entries.
When requesting a DNS record the server must respond with one of two things: either the
DNS record requested or a record for the value that would immediately precede it [2].
A simplif ed section of the NSEC chain for test.com is shown below in Figure 3.2.
Assume a user makes a request for a DNS record for a domain name cts.test.com to the
DNS server. The server does not currently have an entry for the requested domain name,
but the server must prove this to the requester by providing the value that proceeds the
request. For the example the server would return the record associated with bts.test.com
which contains the the NSEC f eld ets.test.com. This informs the requester that the server
does not have an entry for the requested domain name. Since each record is signed, the
requester is able to authenticate the record and infer the absence of the requested domain
name in the DNS server.
Each set of records has a validity time frame so that old records cannot be presented as
current and accurate[2]. This data structure works well for DNS servers since the records
do not change very frequently. When a record corresponding to a new domain name name
1

A more thorough explanation of DNSSEC can be found at http://www.dnssec.net
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Figure 3.2
Simplif ed NSEC Chain Example

is to be added, all of the items in the chain are then updated and signed at the next time
interval[2]. The NSEC chain as described in the specif cation does not allow for dynamic
updates. Updates occur only when validity time of the current records is about to expire
and a new set is generated[2]. In the time between these intervals the records cannot be
modif ed, as this would create the potential of having more than one signed record allowing
the DNS server to decide which it would like to present to requesters.

3.2 Approach
The primary motivation for the dual agent approach stems from the need to separate
tasks that further individual interests from those that further the interests of the community.
The user in control of a mobile device is inherently interested only in the individual needs
and wants, while routing requires the cooperation of the community. This disjoint is a
primary reason to investigate the division of tasks between two entities. The network
agent’s goal is to maintain adherence to rules which are necessary for the community. The
user agent must appease the wishes of the individual. The dual-agent approach wishes to
15

enumerate the tasks that the community must protect and those that the individual wants
to protect. Once the tasks are enumerated, the network agent’s job should be reduced to
the ability to verify that the user agent is fulf lling the requirements of the community.
Apart from low capability, the network agent is also limited by the fact that the user
agent is in physical possession of the network agent. The user agent can power down
the network agent at any time. Furthermore, all communication interfaces are under the
control of the user agent. Thus, any interaction between two network agents has at least
two untrusted user agents in the middle. These inherent restrictions on the network agent
have to be considered in the protocol design.
The strategy adopted in this thesis is to divide the tasks based on the their impact on
the community. The second step is to determine a set of enforceable rules to prevent or
mitigate misbehavior. These rules will necessarily involve some level of redundancy to
verify that tasks are occurring as they should. Such redundancies themselves will consist
of extra tasks to be performed by the user and network agents. It is in our interest to reduce
the extra tasks assigned to the network agent even if it results in a large increase in the user
agent tasks.

3.2.1 Dependent and Independent Tasks
It will be the case that some set of basic tasks are not dependent on other tasks or
events, while some may be dependent on existing information or the completion of other
tasks. For example, a route update is comprised of routes received over time that have
been aggregated into a routing table. Before signing a route update the network agent will
16

require proof that the current advertisement is consistent with the routing updates that had
been previously received from other nodes. On the other hand, for periodic alive messages
(to aff rm a client is still available), no proof is needed. However such messages could
be controlled by rules that govern the rates at which they can be sent (for example once a
minute). While the network agent is unable to control the medium it can refuse to provide
an authenticated alive message to the user agent. Packets sent without authentication by
the network agents will simply be dropped by other nodes (or the network agents of other
nodes).

3.2.2 Attacks and Countermeasures
The model of the dual-agent approach introduces several types of attacks that exploit
the weaknesses of the network agents in regards to their ability to verify the functions of
the user agent. Such operations are performed on behalf of the network agent and the
community. Since the network agent should have extremely low complexity, the network
agent can store little to no history of network activity. This limitation opens the network
agent to attacks such as: fabrication, selective dropping, omission, and replay.
Fabrication in the context of this thesis will refer to the attempt of an adversary to
introduce the existence of a route that does not exist. The act of selective dropping will
refer to a user agent not providing packets received for validation and inclusion by the
network agent. Omission will refer to an act by a user agent where route information
that had been previously validated is omitted by the user agent when network agent is
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requested to sign out-going information. Finally, replay will refer to representation of
previously revoked routing information to the network agent by the user agent.
Fabrication can be mitigated by authentication. For the purpose of this research the
hop to hop authentication is used to counter data fabrication. Each network agent will be
pre-seeded with a key ring that will be used for authenticating other network agents. This
research will not discuss the issues associated with pre-key distribution as it is outside the
scope of this research.
The act of selective dropping by the user agent is slightly more diff cult problem. Since
the user agent has complete control of the communication medium the user could drop data
indiscriminately or selectively. This thesis chooses to counter the problem of selective
dropping through hop-to-hop encryption. The act of indiscriminately dropping packets
is impossible to counter in this model because the user agent has control of the access
medium. Since encryption hides the contents of the message, and the user agent is unable
to decrypt the data. The user agent must provide the information to the network agent
before being able to determine the contents.
The act of omission of a route by the user agent will be countered using the next route
f eld similar to the NSEC f eld in DNSSEC. It is important to note that unlike DNSSEC,
the network agent is the only party verifying the consistency of the data; therefore, public
key cryptography is unnecessary. Symmetric cryptography based on a key hidden within
the conf nes of the network agent’s trusted boundary suff ces. A Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC) could be used where the hash function could simply employ the
hardware block cipher.
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Unfortunately, the NSEC f eld alone is not capable handling the dynamic nature of
a typical network. The network changes frequently and a data structure capable of storing revoked messages is needed. Constant-time insertion and query are desirable traits
in addition to having minimal space requirements. It is highly likely that different routing protocols will require custom data structures to verify that revoked messages are not
passed as a valid routes. The use of bloom f lters are utilized for the dual-agent distancevector protocol. Cuckoo hashing[14] and hash compaction[21] are other methods which
produce similar results. Cuckoo hashing requires a rebuild of the table when collision
loop occurs[14], the requirement of rebuilding the table is unacceptable for the dual-agent
approach. Hash compaction could potentially reduce the size of the structure needed but
it does not have constant time insertion; future research could consider the implications
of this constraint. There are still many other such storage schemes but bloom f lters are
relatively simple to implement and as such were considered the best choice.

19

CHAPTER 4
DUAL-AGENT DISTANCE-VECTOR ROUTING

In this thesis, the broad dual agent strategies discussed in the previous chapter are
applied for securing distance-vector based routing protocols. The distance vector protocol
borrows many elements from from DSDV. The dual-agent protocol takes advantage of
using even sequence numbers to represent reachable route destinations and odd sequence
numbers to represent unreachable route destinations. The metric value of an invalid route
is not set to inf nity. The dual-agent DSDV protocol does not handle intermediate updates
and only relies on periodic updates making it strictly a proactive protocol (and not a hybrid
one like DSDV). Other intricacies from DSDV are omitted for the sake of simplicity.
The dual-agent protocol has three main components: a routing table structure, a routing
update structure, and a Bloom f lter revocation structure. The structure of each of these
components is outlined in the sections below.

4.1 Routing Table Structure
One of the key data structures in any routing protocol is the routing table maintained
by each client. In the case of the dual-agent protocol the routing table is maintained by the
user agent. Routes representing neighbors are not included within the table. The routing
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table is initialized by the network agent at the user agent’s request. The f eld layout of the
structure is presented in Figure 4.1.

Figure 4.1
Route Record Fields

The canonical ordering used for the routing records in the routing table are based on
the destination f eld. The next route f eld points to the destination of the next route record
in the table. The last element in the table will point to the f rst element in the table. An
example of the route table is shown in Figure 4.2. With this layout, a user agent can prove
to the network agent that it does or does not have a route to a specif c client in the network.

4.2 Routing Update Structure
At each periodic update a routing update is generated by each node in the network and
broadcasted to neighbors. The structure of a route update is presented in Figure 4.3. The
structure contains the following information:
• creator–Id of the network agent responsible for this update (must be known for authentication)
• update count–The number of items in the list of updates
• list of updates–A list of updates ordered by their destination f eld
• header HMAC–Authentication appended to verify the integrity of the header
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Figure 4.2
Route Table containing Route Records

Each update entry contains the following f elds: destination, next hop, metric, sequence number, time of creation, and item HMAC.
• destination–Destination associated with route
• next hop–Next hop taken as part of the route
• metric–Hop count associated with reaching the destination
• sequence number–Field that is updated by the destination during a broadcast
• time of creation–The time associated with when the original route was broadcast
• item HMAC–Authentication appended to verify the integrity of the route
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Figure 4.3
Route Update Field Structure

The time-of-creation of a record is used to compute the end-of-life of the record. However different nodes will compute different end-of-life’s depending on the number of hops
that separate the node from the destination (which specif ed the time-of-creation). More
specif cally, the end-of-life for a record indicating time-of-creation Tc , for a node that is h
hops away is
Te = Tc + xTi + hyTi , where

(4.1)

• Ti the length of the time interval between updates
• x  1, and
• y<1
The header HMAC and item HMAC is keyed with the key associated with the neighbor
from with the update was received from or to be sent to.
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4.3 Protocol Operation
Operation begins with a request from the user agent to initialize the network agent and
the routing table. The network agent responds to this request by returning a route record
that represent the client itself. The record for client 4 would look like (4|4|0|0|0|HMAC|4)
where HMAC is the HMAC of all of the f elds in the route table item and a private key
only the network agent has.
Eventually, route updates received by the user agent will need to be merged with the
existing routing table. The routes contained within the updates will either new routes or
updates to existing routes.
• new–The route table does not current contain a route to the destination.
• updates–A route that the route table does currently contain a route to.
Before adding a new record to the route table, the user agent must provide the a route
record with destination less (in the canonical ordering strategy used) than the destination
indicated in the new route record to be added. The record supplied as proof should indicate,
in the next route f eld, a destination greater than the one in the new record.
Before or updating a route record in the routing table, the user agent must provide the
network agent with the route record that the network agent is attempting to update based
on the route update.
Any addition of records or deletion of records will result in invalidated records. For
example, consider a scenario where a node currently has valid records for destinations
4, 6, 8, . . .. If a new record (say for destination 5) is added the record for destination 4
should be modif ed to point to 5. The old record (which pointed to 6) should be expunged.
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Similarly when a record (say 6) is deleted, the record for destination 4 should be modif ed
to point to 8 as the next route record.
It is necessary for the network agent to keep track of all expunged records. If this is not
performed, the user agent, who has a record for 5, can replay the old record (indicating 6
is the record that follows 4) to deny the fact that it has a route to 5. It is obviously desirable
to maintain the list of invalidated records for as small a duration as possible. This is the
primary reason for assigning a specif c life-time to every record stored.
If the life time is f xed, and kept small, many records may expire even before they reach
nodes many hops away. This is the reason that the hop-count is taken into consideration
for computing the end-of-life.
The enforcement of life times to every record calls for some extent of time synchronization. Furthermore some records may have to be deleted due to expiry of life-times.
This can happen even before they are superseded by newer routing records. Thus, prior to
expiry of any route record stored by the user agent, the user agent has to inform the network agent. The network agent has to create a new record which replaces the old previous
record (which points to an invalidated next route). The old previous record (which is still
valid as the end-of-life may be far into the future) needs to be expunged. If this task is
not performed by the user agent, the client’s ability to participate in the network will be
diminished as it will be unable add new records, and ultimately to send routing updates.
Both the user and network agents need to keep track of invalidated records, which however indicate a end-of-life in the future. Bloom f lters were chosen as the data structures
for this purpose, due to their f xed-time insertion and query complexity. Additionally, the
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reduced storage requirements of Bloom f lters make them an good candidate for storing
invalidated records. Further, the hash functions for the Bloom f lter can also be eff ciently
implemented using the block cipher.
More generally, the user and network agents can maintain a set of many Bloom f lters,
each of which represents some range of time in the present or future. The exact number
and range of such f lters were determined experimentally. Recall that when a route record
is removed, updated, or added, one or more revoked messages are produced. Each of the
messages that have an end of life in the future are placed into a specif c Bloom f lter whose
time-range includes the records end-of-life. Later, when a network agent is presented with
a message it can to query the specif c Bloom f lter based on the end of life to determine
if the message is a replay attempt. The Bloom f lters covering the range T1 to T2 should
be maintained till time T2 . After T2 the Bloom f lter can be discarded. In summary, only
items that have been revoked whose end of life has not passed are placed into a Bloom
f lter.
The user agent should be aware if a collision occurs when attempting to add a new
message to the Bloom f lter. If a collision occurs the user agent should provide all of the
messages that produced the collision to the network agent. When the route and associated
data has been verif ed by data from the prior messages, the network agent accepts the new
message as valid.
After receiving a route that is more recent (higher sequence number), or just as recent
while having a lower hop count (lower metric), the previous route is still valid until the end
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of life has passed. To counteract the ability to have two valid routes, the old route must
now be added to the Bloom f lter corresponding to the end of life of that route

4.3.1 Example Routing Table Changes
To add a route, the network agent expects the user agent to provide proof in the form
of the route immediately preceding it canonically and the route to be added. To update
an existing route, the network agent expects the user agent to provide the current route in
the routing table and the new route. This new route could have a better metric or a higher
sequence number.
For the following example, the clients A, B, C, D, and E are connected as shown in
Figure 4.4.
A

B

C

D

E

Figure 4.4
Example Network

The broadcast order will be alphabetical and each client will broadcast only once per
interval. Just after initialization each client will only have a self route. Client A, for example, has only the route (A|A|0|0|0|HMAC|A), and client B has only (B|B|0|0|0|HMAC|B).
Client A broadcasts f rst which causes changes to the state of B’s routing table. The
changes do not require any bloom f lters to be tested because the route learned was a
neighbor. No route representing a neighbor is used to indicate a next route. This is re-

27

ferred to as the neighbor route rule. The “-” is used to indicate that a neighbor will not
have a next route and no other next route points to it.
• (A|A|1|0|3|HMAC|−)
• (B|B|0|0|0|HMAC|B)
Still within the f rst time interval, the route table of C is (C|C|0|0|0|HMAC|C) before
B broadcasts. C receives two routes from B, the route to A and the route to B. The routing
table below represents the changes after processing the f rst update from B. No items need
to be added to a bloom f lter because the only route altered is the self route. If the route
modif ed is the self route nothing must be added to any bloom f lter. This is referred to as
the self route rule. The processing of the route to B falls under the neighbor route rule and
is not shown.
• (A|B|2|0|4|HMAC|C)
• (C|C|0|0|0|HMAC|A)
While still in the f rst interval, the route table for client D is (D|D|0|0|0|HMAC|D)
before receiving an update from C. When processing route A to the table the self route rule
applies and no additional steps are performed.
• (A|C|3|0|5|HMAC|D)
• (D|D|0|0|0|HMAC|A)
When adding route B to the table no current rules apply. Route A is not a neighbor and
is not the self route. Any changes to this route are not protected by the network agent
unless it is added to the next route chain. The old route A, (A|C|3|0|5|HMAC|D), must
be provided to the network agent as proof. If the route is shown to be valid the route
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must be added to a bloom f lter and the new route as shown below would replace it. This
route must f rst be tested for existence in the bloom f lter containing routes that expire in
interval 3. Assume that a bloom f lter represents a full time interval and the route expires
in interval 3, the bloom f lter with duration interval 3 (inclusive) to interval 4(exclusive).
This is referred to as the distant route rule. If the addition caused no collision in the f lter
when adding the route to the bloom f lter then nothing else need be done. However, if
the addition did cause a collision it would need to be hashed to a 16bit value and stored
separate from the bloom f lter.
• (A|C|3|0|5|HMAC|B)
• (B|C|2|0|4|HMAC|D)
• (D|D|0|0|0|HMAC|A)

4.3.2 Example Bloom Filter
The user agent should be aware if any route provided as proof caused a false positive
within the bloom f lter queried. If a false positive occurs the user agent must provide one or
more routes that are invalid that caused the collision to occur. These routes are hashed and
verif ed to be the cause of the collision. The invalid routes provided must have and end of
life corresponding to the duration of the bloom f lter queried where the collision occurred.
This is important to note because when a collision occurs it requires more processing for
the network agent to verify. Further, a new value to be added to the bloom f lter and causes
a collision that item is stored in a 16bit hash and not in the bloom f lter. In this way the
list can be consulted to ensure that the user agent is not using a collision to undermine the
security of the system.
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Any time a bloom f lter must be consulted for verif cation the route provided as proof
must be queried in the bloom f lter and any 16bit hashes stored outside the bloom f lter. If
it is shown as a hit in the bloom f lter, the user agent must provide the messages that caused
the collision, each of these messages are queried in the bloom f lter to verify that they do
in fact cause the collision. If any of these messages hash to the 16bit hashes then the
message provided is invalid and cannot be used as proof. This is based on the assumption
that 16bits is enough to not have another collision within the the collection of 16bit hashes.
For some bloom f lter, a collision has occurred on route (B|C|2|4|6|HMAC|D) the
user agent now provides (as example) (A|C|3|2|6|HMAC|B) and (E|D|2|4|6|HMAC|A)
which has to the same values as (B|C|2|4|6|HMAC|D). The network agent hashes the
two messages to verify the collision and also verif es they are in fact not any of the messages in the collection of 16bit hashes associated with the bloom f lter.
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CHAPTER 5
EXPERIMENT DESIGN

The basis for revocation in the dual-agent distance vector protocol is the assumption
that a limited number of insertions and queries will be made during the time intervals.
Having a limited number of transactions reduces the computational overhead on the network agent. The Bloom f lters will need to be maintained until such time the elements
within one have all expired. This assumption must be verif ed through experimentation.
There are currently multiple factors that could potentially effect the necessary size and
number of Bloom f lters required. Network size, client status changes, and number of
neighbors. A baseline must be established to test some of these factors. The baseline for
the experiment will be based on a network of one hundred clients with the clients having
an average of f ve neighbors. Further, each client will have a 10% probability of changing
state. Changing state will cause a node that is awake to sleep and a sleeping node to awake.
For the purpose of the experiment physical movement of the clients will not be modeled.
Time will be divided into two types of divisions. The f rst will be referred to as an interval
which represents the amount of time for all the clients in the network to broadcast their
routing information once. The second will be called a tick which represents some unit
of time that a single node uses to communicate its route updates to all of its neighbors.
The baseline experiment will monitor the one hundred clients for one hundred intervals.
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During this time each revocation will be recorded and at the beginning of each interval
each client’s routing table will also be recorded, for later analysis.
Two different processes will evaluate the data recorded. The f rst will parse the tables
of all the clients at each interval and compute the following metrics about the routes for
each node:
• Invalid entry (IE )–Client has a route entry but the destination is physically disconnected from the source
• Invalid route (IR )–Client has a route entry but the route is unable to deliver to the
destination
• Valid entry (VE )–Client has a route entry and the route is able to deliver to the
destination or the destination is unreachable and the client is aware of this
• Path Exists (PE )–Client does not have a route entry but a physical path exists
• No Path (NP )–Client does not have a route entry and no physical path exists
From the results of these metrics the following formula will be calculated to determine the
eff ciency (E), route accuracy, of the protocol:
E=

VE
VE + IE + IR + PE

(5.1)

The minimum lifetime value (xTi from Equation 4.1) is an initial value for the end
of life. By adjusting the minimum lifetime, the number of Bloom f lters required at any
given time is altered; additionally, if the value is set too low the network is unable to reach
a stable state where routes exist for all nodes. Figure 5.2 shows the results of minimum
lifetime on the eff ciency of the network. As the minimum lifetime is increased more
Bloom f lters or larger Bloom f lters are required to maintain the system.
The average eff ciency metric will be computed for three network sizes to determine
the effect of adjusting the minimum lifetime of the eff ciency of the network.
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While trying to achieve a high level of routing eff ciency, we should simultaneously
strive to reduce the space complexity of the Bloom f lters. The optimal choice of the
number of Bloom f lters and the parameters of each f lter will depend on the number of
invalidated messages that need to be stored at any time.
In our simulations all invalidated records, indicating their end-of-life and the time at
which revocation occurred, were stored to facilitate off-line analysis of optimal parameters. Off line analysis involves f xing the bloom f lter duration of each f lter (for example
1 time interval or

1
2

time interval or 4 time intervals) and computing the probability distri-

bution of the number of items added to each Bloom f lter.
Equation 5.2[4] is the asymptotic approximation of the probability that a collision has
occurred in a bloom f lter, where
• k is the number of hash functions,
• m is the bit size of the bloom f lter, and
• n is the number of elements in the f lter.



f = 1 − e−km/n

k

(5.2)

Let pi (n) be the probability that n elements were added to a Bloom f lter of length m,
utilizing k hash functions. The expected number of collisions that can occur (during the
time a particular Bloom f lter is actively maintained) is now:
C(k, m) =

1
X



pi (n)n 1 − e−km/n

n=1

k

(5.3)

In practice, when a collision occurs, the network agent cannot add the record to the Bloom
f lter. The records should be maintained separately (in addition to the Bloom f lter). For
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example, a succinct hash of the record could be stored by the network agent. It is probably
reasonable to attempt to choose the parameters k and m such that C(k, m) is around 1. By
choosing the value at 1 we assume that on average only one has will need to be stored in
addition to the bloom f lter. The choice of a 16bit hash seems reasonable to assume that no
collisions will occur between such a small set. Equation 5.4 shows the space complexity
(s(f, k, m)) for one network agent; let f be the number of bloom f lters a network agent
must maintain.
s(f, k, m) = f (m + C(k, m) × 16)

(5.4)

5.1 Simulation Results
5.1.1 Eff ciency
For the baseline several values were f xed and ten runs were performed to determine
the best possible results that could be expected. The probability a client is toggled alive
or inactive for an interval is set a 10%. Each simulation consisted of 100 clients randomly
distributed on a unit square who’s radius of communication was adjusted until the clients
had an average of 5 neighbors. The simulation lasts for 100 time intervals. The minimum
lifetime, a value that directly effects the end of life, was set to a value that placed the
end of life beyond the scope of the simulation. This allows for a baseline or maximal
measurement for the eff ciency of the protocol to be determined. The average of the runs
is displayed in Figure 5.1. The graph plots the eff ciency versus the time interval the data
was collected. The average maximum eff ciency rating for a 100 network with 10% client
f uctuation is approximately 90%.
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Figure 5.1
Average Network Eff ciency with Extreme Minimal Lifetime
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The impact of network size will also be important to determine for the use of the
dual-agent protocol. The assumption was that the choice of minimum lifetime would be
similar despite network size. This assumption was tested for a networks of size 100, 200,
and 400. The values chosen are based on the assumption that 400 or fewer nodes is a
reasonable number for a proactive protocol. The minimum lifetime still appears to remain
an accurate value in determining the eff ciency of the network regardless of network size.
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Figure 5.2
Average Eff ciency of Size 100 Network

36

1
0.9
0.8

Eff ciency

0.7

Min. lifetime 16
Min. lifetime 8
Min. lifetime 4
Min. lifetime 2
Min. lifetime 1

0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0

0

5

10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95

Time Interval

Figure 5.3
Average Eff ciency of Size 200 Network

37

1
0.9
0.8

Eff ciency

0.7

Min. lifetime 16
Min. lifetime 8
Min. lifetime 4
Min. lifetime 2
Min. lifetime 1

0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0

0

5

10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95

Time Interval

Figure 5.4
Average Eff ciency of Size 400 Network

5.1.2 Bloom Space Complexity
The  (Bloom f lter duration) was tested at the values of 10%, 25%, 50%, 100% and
200% of the time interval. The values of the Bloom f lter were optimized for expected
number of collisions of 1 and 0.1. Elements that collide would need to be stored outside
the bloom f lter; the experiment assumes that the storage of each element is a 16 bit hash.
A higher number of collisions, such as 1, the reduction in storage requires the network
agent to perform more calculations both when inserting additional elements and when
querying elements. Therefore, given an expected number of collisions of 1 each Bloom
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f lter requires 16 bits of extra storage and 1 in 10 require 16 bits given an expected number
of collisions of 0.1 (requiring approximately 1.6 bits per Bloom f lter). Those results are
found in Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6, respecfully.
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Figure 5.5
Expected Number of Collisions 1
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Table 5.1
Bloom Filter Parameters with Expected Number of Collisions 1
Network Size 
m k
100 0.5 318 5
200 0.5 588 5
400 0.5 930 5
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Figure 5.6
Expected Number of Collisions 0.1

40

0.1

Table 5.2
Bloom Filter Parameters with Expected Number of Collisions 0.1
Network Size

m k
100 0.25 63 2
200 0.25 123 3
400 0.25 209 3

5.2 Analysis
Choosing a minimum lifetime of 2 intervals provides a high level of eff ciency while
reducing the number of f lters need. The growth of the network has a slightly less then
linear growth with respect to the average space required per node. As shown in Figure 5.7,
when expecting an average of 1 collisions per Bloom f lter the appropriate  is 0.25 for
all network sizes; when selecting a lower level of collisions (0.1 per Bloom f lter)  = 0.5
provides the most eff cient use of space for all network sizes tested.
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400

CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

The results show that a high eff ciency can be achieved for a dual-agent distance-vector
protocol, while keeping the memory requirements very low. The approach taken advantageously reuses a single symmetric cipher for both encryption and hashing operations.
Bloom f lters reduce the space requirements of revocation lists to a manageable size even
for networks as large as 400 nodes. The bloom f lters for the largest network only required
approximately 2.5kB of storage space for an average of 1 collision per f lter. For a factor
of 10 reduction in the number of collisions the device would still only require about 6kB
of storage. This results in a slightly less then linear growth of space with respect to the
network size.
This thesis identif ed four primary types of attacks that exploit the inherent limitations
of the network agent: fabrication, selective dropping, omission, and replay. Further, the
research has presented low complexity strategies to address each attack. These strategies were applied to a distance-vector protocol, and the resulting protocol was extensively
studied through simulation to compare trade-offs between routing eff ciency and network
agent complexity.
The research presented opens a plethora of new approaches to securing ad hoc routing
protocols. While this thesis only considers the dual-agent approach as applied to a single
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protocol; other routing protocols, such as DSR or AODV, could be considered for their
applicability to the dual-agent approach. As specif c requirements of each protocol are
likely to require substantially different data structures, the choice of suitable data structures could be a challenging problem potentially leading to the development of new data
structures.
The f eld of secure co-processing and tamper resistant technology has opportunities to
create and apply technologies to build low complexity network agents and determine best
practices in their construction and interfaces.
While this thesis has restricted itself to the use of the dual-agent approach as applied to
routing protocols, the approach could be applicable to f elds such as distributed computing,
ubiquitous computing, and autonomic computing.
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